1Introduction
How doesmemory work? How doweunderstandlanguage, andproduce itsothat others canu nderstand?How dow eperceiveour environment? How dow ei nfer from patterns oflightorsoundthe presence ofobjects inour environment,andtheir properties? How dowereason,andsolveproblems? How dowethink?
Thesea resomeofthe foundationalq uestions thatcognitivepsychology examines. Theyarefoundationalpartly becauseeach concerns the natureofabasic psychologicalability,abilitiesthatweoftentakefor granted, yetwhich arevitalto our normal,healthyfunctioningandarekeytoour understandingofwhatitmeans to be human. Andtheyaref oundationalp artly becausetheyarei mportant for psychologyasawhole, andnot just cognitivepsychology. For instance, how canwe hopeto understandcompletely the behaviour ofemployeesinanorganization unless wefi rst understandtheirp erceptions andmemories,a ndh ow theyr eason and attempt to solveproblems? How canweunderstandthe wayinwhich peopleinteract to shapeoneanother'sopinions if wedonot understandhow peopleunderstandand process language, andhow theymakejudgements?
Throughout thisbook,the various authors tackletheseandotherquestions,and show you how much ofthesef oundations cognitivepsychologists haveso far uncovered.The book begins withanexploration ofperceptualprocesses,movestoa discussion ofcategorization andlanguage, through to memory,andthentothinking processes. The last part ofthe book isdevoted to widerissues:to topicsthathave beenthoughttopresent achallenge to cognitivepsychology-such asconsciousness andemotion -andto someofthe themesandtheoreticalquestions which pervade the cognitiveapproach.
Inthischapter,wetry to answerthe question 'Whatiscognitivepsychology?' and, ins odoing, outlinesomeofthe foundationalassumptions thatcognitive psychologists tendto make, asw ell ass omeofthe reasons whyitiss uch an important andf ascinatingsubject-not least the factt hatitr aisesm any deepand important questions concerningthe mind.We considersomeofthe issuesthathave attracted andcontinueto attractthe interest ofcognitivepsychologists,andsomeof the assumptions theym akei no rdert odevelop models andtheories. We also considert he cognitivea pproach ingeneralandthe kindso fe xplanation cognitive psychologists favour.We touch upon the relations betweencognitivepsychology andothers ub-disciplineso fpsychology,andthosebetweencognitivepsychology andotherdisciplines(such asphilosophy,computing, andlinguistics).
Therearemany substantialissuesthatweonly touch on -itisnot easy to define the relationshipbetweent wo academic disciplines,f or example-a ndso weonly hopeto conveysomethingoftheirflavour here.Our aiminthischapteristherefore merely to introduce cognitivepsychology,to explainsomeofits keydistinguishing features,a ndto uncovers omeofthe many broad issuesl yingb eneathi ts surface.
You will obtainaricherandmorecompleteoverviewofcognitivepsychologyfrom readingsubsequent chapters,a nde specially Chapter1 7. You mayfindthatt he current chapterraisesasmany questions asitanswers andthat,asyour readingof thisbook progresses,you periodically want to revisitt hischaptert ogainab etter understandingofissuesthat,on first reading, seemed hazy.If thischapterwereonly to raisequestions thatyou haveinmindwhenyou read subsequent chapters,andto arouseyour curiosity sufficiently thaty ou periodically revisitt hischapter,i tw ill haveserved its purposewell.
2Whatiscognitivepsychology?
Whatiscognitivepsychology? Well,aswithmost questions,therecanbe short or longa nswers. The short,though not uncontentious,a nswerist hatcognitive psychologyisthe branch ofpsychologydevoted to the scientific studyofthe mind. Straightforwardasthismayseem,to understandthe natureofcognitivepsychology means diggingdeeper. Anditisanexcavation thatraisesall mannerofsubstantial andinterestingissues-asdiverseasthe natureofnormality andcomputation,and the importance ofindividualdifferencesandbrainimages.
ACTIVITY 1.1
Giventhe abovedefinition thatcognitivepsychologyisthe scientific studyofthe mind, take af ewminutest ow rited own some ofwhaty ou would expectits characteristic featurestobe.For example, you mightwant to list whatyou take to be the characteristic featuresofa'scientific'approach withinpsychologygenerally; andyou mightw ant to list some ofthe characteristic topicsy ou would expect cognitivepsychologists to study.
Keepyour list readytorefertoasyou read the rest ofthischapter. Activity 1.1 raisesanumberofinterestingquestions about the natureandscopeof cognitivepsychology. Whatdoesitm eanfor apsychologyt obe 'cognitive',f or example?Did your list makea ny reference to normality? Well,whenw esayt hat cognitivepsychologyist he scientific studyo fthe mind, thisu sually means 'normally functioningh umanm inds'. We candevelop anu nderstandingofthe normalhumanm indi nv arious ways:b ys tudyingpeoplewithnormalm indsand normalbrains,f or example;but also bys tudyingpeoplewitha bnormalm indso r abnormalbrains too,bystudyinganimals ofotherspecies,andevendevices,such as computers,withno brainatall. Withrespectt ojust thiso nei ssue-normalitycognitivepsychologyisclearly abroad enterprise.Box 1.1 givesabrief illustration ofhow evidence from peoplewithbraindamage caninform our understandingof normalcognition. Don't worry too much if you cannot follow all ofthe details atthis stage -j ust try to getaf eelfor how cognitivepsychologists havetried to relate evidence from brain-damaged patients to normalcognition.
1.1
Research study Category-specific impairmentsI: neuropsychological methods Warrington andShallice (1984) describefour patients withspecific impairments inrecognizinglivingthings. Becausethe impairment wasthoughttobe specificto the category ofl ivingthings,i thasbeencalled a category-specific impairment.Onepatient,JBR, for example, experienced braindamageaftersuffering fromherpessimplexencephalitis. Asaresult,whenaskedto name pictures,he correctlynamedonlyapproximately6percent ofthe picturesoflivingthings,yet around90 percent ofthe pictureso fnon-livingthings. Otherp atients,though fewero fthem, haveb eenfoundto show ano ppositei mpairment -thatis,a n impairment primarilytothe categoryofnon-livingthings (HillisandCaramazza, 1991) .
Thesestudieshavesuggested to researchers that,i nn ormalc ognition,the categoriesoflivingandnon-livingthingsmightbe represented and/or processed differently. For example, onesuggestion,thathassince beenmuch debated, has beenthatinnormalcognition the functional andsensory propertiesofcategories arerepresented differently,a ndthatlivingthingst endto dependm oreon the sensory properties,while non-livingthingsdependmoreon functional properties (WarringtonandShallice,1984) . The suggestion wasalso atfirst thoughttohelp explainw hyJBR, on the assumption thathe hasanimpairment for sensory properties,wasalso foundto show impairmentsfor some non-livingcategories, such asthe categoriesofmusical instruments andfoods.
'Cognitivepsychology' canalso be used to refert oactivitiesinavariety ofother disciplinesandsub-disciplines(did your list refertootherdisciplines?). Somesubdisciplines,likec ognitiveneuropsychology,d evelopmentalcognitiveneuropsychology,c ognitiveneuropsychiatry,a ndc ognitiveneuroscience,i nclude the cognitivesignifierint heiro wn titles. Others,such asbehaviouraln eurobiology, linguisticsandartificialintelligence, donot; andsomepractitioners ofthesemight well objecttofindingthemselvesincluded underthe cognitivepsychologyumbrella. Asyou will see inChapter5, uncertainty andnegotiation regardingmembershipare characteristic ofmany if not all ofour conceptualcategories. Our advice isnot to worry too much about such definitionalissuesatt hiss tage, andperhaps not even latero n. But onethingthatisclearist hatt herei sn oeasily identified boundary betweencognitivepsychologyandwork carried on inotherdisciplineswithwhich cognitivepsychologists frequently engage.
Your list offeaturesofcognitivepsychologymayhavereferred to someofthe methodst hatcognitivepsychologists employ:e xperiments,models (including computermodels),neuropsychologicalinvestigations,andneuroimaging(or brain scans). Box 1.2 (overleaf)continuest he discussion ofc ategory-specific impairments,a ndd escribesastudyt hatcombinesfeatureso fe xperimentaland neuroimagingmethods.
1.2
Research study Category-specifici mpairmentsII:e xperimentaland neuroimagingmethods Devlin etal.( 2000) combined featureso fe xperimental andneuroimaging methodstoinvestigatewhetherthe categoriesoflivingandnon-livingthingscould be associated withrepresentationsindifferent parts ofthe brain. Onetechnique theyused wasalexical decision task.Inthistask, participants eitherhearorsee stringsofletters (e.g.theymightsee the strings'warnd'or'world') andhaveto judge whethereach stringisawordor not. Experimenters typicallyrecordboth the judgment made andthe amount oftime participants take to make their response(perhaps bypressingthe appropriatebutton on akeyboardor response pad). Anothert ask, thatDevlin etal.called asemantic categorization task, required participants,havingseenthree wordspresented oneafteranother,to judge whetheraf ourthwordb elongedto the same category ast he first three. Devlin etal. carefullymatched wordsfor wordfrequencyandletterlength.Whilst performingthe lexical decision andsemantic categorization tasksdescribed above, participants werescanned usingpositron emission tomography( PET) technology. Anothergroup ofparticipants performedthe semantic categorization taskusingpicturest hatw erem atchedf or visual complexity;t hese participantsw erescanned usingf unctional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI) technology. Bothofthesescanningtechnologiesenable experimenters to identify regions ofthe brainthatareparticularlyactiveduringthe performance ofatask. Critically,Devlin etal. foundno differencesbetweenthe categoriesoflivingand non-livingthingsintermsofactiveregions ofthe brainineitherthe PET studyor the fMRI study(see colour Plates1and2). Sothe differencesinrespresentation discussed inBox 1.1 mayn ot be associated withd ifferent brainr egions (or perhaps thesetechniqueswerenot sensitiveenough to detectsuch differences). Box 1.3 describesastudyemployingc ognitivemodellingmethodst oexamine category-specific impairments.
1.3
Research study Category-specifici mpairmentsIII: cognitivemodelling Boxes1.1 to 1.3 illustratesomeofthe methodsthatwill be referred to throughout thisbook,a nda bout someofwhich wewill saym orelater. But,perhaps more obvious thanany oftheseissues,Activity 1.1 raisesthe question ofthe subjectmatter ofcognitivepsychology. Whatisitthatcognitivepsychologists study? Aneasy wayo fa nsweringthe question (andoneyou mighthavea dopted for Activity 1.1) isscanningthisbook'stableofcontents. Thiswill giveyou agoodidea ofthe topicscognitivepsychologists typically study,a s,ofc ourse, will previous studyo fpsychology. Certainly,the topicso fperception,a ttention,language, categorization,reasoning, problemsolving, andmemory arecentraltothe studyof cognition. Andcognition hasbroadened to include topicsthathavenot always been seenasreadily amenableto acognitiveapproach (e.g.consciousness andemotion). The subsequent chapters will havemuch moreto sayabout theseissuesthanwecan here.Activity 1.2 providesanotherw ayo fthinkinga bout the topicst hatinterest cognitivepsychologists.
ACTIVITY 1.2
Atthismoment your behaviour involvesgettinginformation fromthisbook.Your eyesmaybe scanningacross the page anddetectingpatterns ofcolour,andlightand shade;or,ifyou arelisteningto thisbookon audioCD or itisbeingmachine-read froma nelectronic copy,your ears will be detectingsoundwaveso fvarying intensity andpitch.Your behaviour canalso be seeninawidercontext:itisjust one aspectofwhatisinvolved instudyingpsychology. Take afewminutestojot down your explanation for your behaviour:ifsomeonewereto askwhyyou arebehaving int he wayyou are, whatwould your answers be?Try to thinkofmany different ways ofa nsweringthe question. List too any processest haty ou thinkm ightbe goingon inyour mind-how would you describe them?
COMMENT
The first thingto noteisthatyour behaviour canbe explained inmany different ways. For example, you mighthavenoted thaty our readingi sboundup withafeelingof elation -perhaps you lovestudyingc ognitivepsychology-or a feelingofa nxietyperhaps you areuncertainofobtainingagoodcoursegrade.Your explanation adverts to emotions.Perhaps you jotted down asananswerthatyou reasoned thatyou ought to read thisbooksince you want to dowell on your course.Perhaps doingwell on your coursei sp art ofastrategyt or each ag oal, or solveaproblem such ashow to improveyour qualifications. You mightalso havesuggested thatyou decided to read thisbook-perhaps faced withdifferent ways ofspendingyour time, you judged that thisw ould be the most beneficial (we'll try not to lety ou down!). You mighthave thoughtt herea reprocessesgoingon iny our mindto dow ith reasoning , problem solving and decision making .
Itmightbe thatyou arereadingthischapterfor asecondtime becauseyou want to make sureyou remember it. So,your explanation adverts to memory,andthe processes thatareresponsible for thingsbeingremembered (andforgotten).
How elsemightyou haveexplained your behaviour? You mighthavesuggested that you weretryingto understand the chapter; thatyou behaved the wayyou did because you werei nvolved inu nderstandingwords,phrases,a ndsentences. You mayhave indicated thatt herem ust be processesfor understanding language.Perhaps there wereotherexplanations you offered.Maybe you explained your readingofthe book bysaying'Thatiswhatbooksarefor' -becauseyou categorized itasabook.Maybe you suggested you werescanningyour eyesacross the page ino rdert o perceive and recognize words. And, just maybe, you suggested thatyour behaviour washappening becauseyou werepaying attention,andnot beingdistracted byatelephoneor adoor bell.
The wordsinemphasisint he previous paragraphsall provide important means for explainingbehaviour thatareused bycognitivepsychologists,andareall major topics ofthisbook. Activity 1.2 shows how everydaybehaviour canbe explained inanumbero f different ways,andasinvolvingmany different kindsofcognitiveprocess. Infact, all ofthe typesofexplanation referred to inthe comment on Activity 1.2 areonesthat will be developed ats omelengthi nt hisbook. However,acorollary ofthe observations made inActivity 1.2 ist hatcognitivepsychologists try to devise studiest hatisolatethe particularcognitiveprocessesu nderinvestigation -f or example, aresearcherinterested inl anguage processingwill try to devisetheir studiess ot hatt heym easurelanguage processeso nly,a nda renot unwittingly influenced byotherprocesses,such asemotion or reasoning.Consideralso how the studiesreferred to inBoxes1.1 to 1.3 try to focus exclusively on the issueofcategory specificity.Indeed, itisag enerals trategyw ithincognitivepsychologyt ot ry to isolateparticularcognitiveprocessesfor furtherinvestigation. Table1.1 lists some prevalent assumptions to which thisstrategygivesrise. . Cognitivepsychologycanbe characterized intermsofits subjectmatter(see the table ofcontents for thisbook).
. Everydaybehaviour involvesmultiple cognitiveprocesses: -c ognitivestudiestendto isolateoneprocess or setofprocessesfor study.
3Ab riefh istoryofcognitivepsychology
Cognitivepsychologydid not beginatany onedefiningmoment,andtherearemany antecedents to its evolution asab ranch ofe nquiry.Int hiss ection wewill briefly sketch someofthoseantecedents andtry to indicatehow andwhytheyresulted inthe development ofwhatt odayw ec all cognitivepsychology. However,a ll written history isnecessarily selectiveandsimplified, andahistoricalaccount asbrief asthe oneweareabout to givemust be especially so. We start withintrospectionism.
3.1Introspectionism
Modern experimentalpsychologyhasits roots inthe work conducted inEuropein the mid nineteenthc entury bys uch peoplea sDonders,F echner,H elmholtz and Mach.WhenWundtestablished the first dedicated psychologylaboratory inLiepzig in1879,hesoughttobuildupon the efforts ofthesepioneers. He took consciousness to be the propers ubjectm attero fpsychology. Accordingto Wundt,physical scientists studyt he objects ofthe physicalw orlde itherdirectly or,moreoften, through observation ofthe readingso ninstruments. Ineithercase, observation is mediated byconscious experience, but for physicalscientists thingsinthe worldare the objectofstudynot the conscious experience bymeans ofwhich weknow them. Psychologywouldbedifferent inthatitwouldtakeasits subjectmatterconscious experience itself. Wundtadopted introspection asaresearch method, believingthatp roperly trained psychologists shouldbeableto makeobservations oftheirown experience in amannersimilartothe wayproperly trained physicists makeselectiveobservations ofthe world.Wundtfully understoodthe need to designexperiments withadequate controls andto produce replicableresults. He also made useofobjectivemeasuresof performance, such asreaction time(RT). The focus ofhisinterest,however,wasthe conscious experience thatpreceded the response.For example, if onecondition inan experiment yielded longerRTst hananother,h ewanted to know how the two precedingc onscious experiencesdiffered.Wundtw asn ot concerned withthe unconscious processesinvolved inr espondingto asimplestimulus -the rapid information-processingoperations that,asyou will findinthe followingchapters, form much ofthe subjectm attero fmodern cognitivepsychology. He considered theseto lie inthe realm ofphysiologyratherthanofpsychology.
Ino pposition to Wundt'sLiepzig school wast he Würzburgschool of introspection. Its leader,K ülpe, wasaf ormers tudent ofW undt's,whow ithh is colleaguesandstudents developed analternativeviewofconscious experience and whatcouldb erevealed byintrospection. We cancharacterizethe maindifference betweenthe two schools interms ofadistinction thatwill be morefully introduced in Chapter3inrelation to the topic ofperception,although the protagonists wouldnot haveused theseexactterms themselves. Put simply,the Liepzig school heldthatthe contents ofc onsciousness arec onstructed 'bottom-up' from simplesensations combined inaccordance withthe strengthofassociation betweenthem(something likethe connectionism you canread about inChapters 4, 16 and17). The Würzburg school,on the otherhand, heldthatthe contents ofconsciousness aredetermined ina much more'top-down' fashion bythe natureofthe task thatoneisengaged upon. Külpeandhiscolleaguessometimesstudied simpletasks,but tended to favour more complexonesinwhich mentalacts such asattending, recognizing, discriminating andwillingplayed alargerrole.
Introspectionism went into aterminaldeclineduringthe first two decadesofthe twentiethc entury.The details ofthe many unresolved disagreements betweent he two schools ofintrospectionism need not detainushere, but itisworthnotingtwo things. First,the introspectionists developed elaboratec lassifications ofc onscious experience, atopic thathasq uiterecently begun to attractt he attention of psychologists once again(see Chapter15). Second, although psychologists beganto losei nterest inconsciousness duringthosetwo decades,the exploration of consciousness still remained centraltodevelopments inthe visualandliterary arts (e.g.cubism ande xpressionism inp ainting, andJ amesJoyce, Virginia Woolfa nd Gertrude Steininliterature).
3.2Gestalt psychology
The perceived failureso fi ntrospectionism provoked anumbero fi ntellectual reactions. InEurope, the gestalt psychologists built upon the work ofthe Würzburg school andargued thatthe contents ofconsciousness cannot be analysed into simple component sensations. Accordingto Wundt,the perception ofmovement results from asequence ofsensations correspondingto ano bjecto ccupyingsuccessive locations overtime.However,Wertheimerargued in1912 that'puremovement' can be perceived directly; itdoesnot haveto be 'inferred'from changesinthe location of anobject. Agoodexampleiswhenwesee the windgust through grass. Bladesof grass bendinsuccession but no blade changeslocation. Whatweperceiveispure motion (ofthe invisiblewind)without amovingobject. (Modern studiesshow that motion perception can,infact,ariseeitheronthe basisofthe changinglocation ofan objecto rfrom successivec hangesacross space without amovingobject.) Gestalt psychologists also emphasized the importance ofthe perception ofstimulus patterningto our conscious experience.Atuneplayed ino nekeyo no nesort of instrument remains the sametunewhenp layed inanotherk eyo ro nadifferent instrument. Since the notes,or the soundsmakingup the notes,havechanged ineach case, theremust be moreto the tunethancanbe foundbyananalysisinto simple auditory sensations. The tunei sint he perceived relationships betweent he notes, theirpatterning.
Meanwhile, int he USA, WilliamJameso pposed introspectionism withh is 'functionalist psychology'. Soundingremarkably likeanexponent ofwhatisnow called evolutionary psychology,Jamesstated that,'Our various ways offeelingand thinkingh aveg rown to be whatt heyareb ecauseoftheiru tility ins hapingour reactions to the outerworld'. Thesefunctions ofthe mindwere, inJames'sview,the propers ubjectm atterfor psychology. Perceivinga ndthinking, grief andreligious experience, aspsychologicalfunctions,werethemselvestobe the focus ofinterest, ratherthanthe evanescent contents ofconsciousness on which the introspectionists had fixated.However,James'sideasweresoon to be largely swept aside byanother andmorepowerful current inUS thought,which wasbehaviourism.
3.3Behaviourism
The founders ofb ehaviourism wered rivenbyv arious motives,not all shared in common. Watson,the principalstandard-bearerfor the newkindofpsychology,was especially keentomovepsychologicalresearch out ofthe laboratory andinto 'the realworld'. He wasless interested infinedistinctions ofconscious experience than inhow peopleactineverydaylife, andinhow theycanbe influenced.He wanted to see psychologicalk nowledge appliedto education,c linicalp roblems and advertising, andh ei nitiated work inall thesea reas. Not all behaviourists werea s zealous asWatson whenitcameto applyingpsychology,but onebelief theydid have incommon wasthatpsychologyshouldbescientific andobjective;andbythisthey meant thatits subjectm atters houldb epublicly observable.Consciousness is( at best) only privately observable;itisn ot publicly observable.Whatisp ublicly observablei sbehaviour andstimuli.Sop sychologists such asThorndike, Watson and, later,Skinner,Eysenckandothers argued thatpsychologyshouldbescientific inits approach, andshouldseekt oexplainbehaviour through reference only to stimuli.The emphasisonpublic observation wasintended to place psychologyonan objectivef ooting, akint ot he naturals ciencesl ikephysicsandc hemistry,a ndi t reflected awiderp hilosophicalconsensus ast ot he propern atureofscientific enquiry.
3.3.1Science andthe unobservable
Inall humanefforts to comprehendthe worldthereisatension between,on the one hand, observableevents and, on the otherhand, the oftenencountered need when explainingthemt op ostulateunobservabletheoreticalentitiesandf orces,whether godsoratoms. Thistension iscentraltoscience.Akeyidea inthe development of science hasbeenthatknowledge shouldbeempirical,based on experience not on received wisdom or purely rationalcalculation.Observation iso neofthe touchstoneso fscience, but scientific theoriesalso refert ou nobservables. The explanation thatphysicsoffers for anapplefallingto Earthinvokesthe notion ofa gravitationalforce, somethingthatisn ot directly observable.Similarly,i n explainingwhyac ompass needlepoints to magnetic north, physicists talk of magnetic fields,andlinesofmagnetic force.But thesethingstoo areunobservable.If you haveeverplaced iron filingsnearamagnet,you will see thattheywill moveto orient themselvesalongthe linesofthe magnetic field.But,strictly,wedon'tobserve the magnetic field, nor the linesofmagnetic force, but rathertheirinfluence upon the iron filings. All naturalsciencesemploy unobservable, theoreticalconstructs thatare invoked inordertoexplainobservations. For example, chemistry appeals to notions such ast he energyl evels ofe lectrons ino rdert oexplainw hycompoundsr eact. Theselevels areunobservabletoo,ofc ourse.So,the factt hatad isciplinei s committed to explainingobserved behaviourbyr eference to hypothesized, unobservableconstructs doesnot initselfrenderthe disciplineunscientific.
But to findscientific acceptance, unobservableconstructs haveto be seentodo useful theoreticalwork. WhenNewton proposed the notion ofagravitationalforce, certaincriticsimmediately accused himo fi ntroducingamysticaln otion into 'the news cience'. Newton'sideasgained acceptance only becausetheym eto ther scientific criteria -such aselegance, simplicity andrigour -andbecausethe concept ofg ravitation,d espitei ts somewhatm ysterious nature, had awide range of application. Gravitation explained not just the fall ofobjects to the groundbut also the rhythmofthe tidesandthe movements ofthe planets. Itcouldalso be precisely formulated mathematically asaninversesquarelaw:the attraction betweenany two bodiesv ariesast he squareofthe distance betweent hem. Ino therw ords,the willingness ofthe scientific community to countenance ahypotheticalunobservable dependsonhow useful itisjudged to be on arange ofcriteria.
Science hashad to livewiththe necessity for unobservables. But acceptance through necessity isnot liking, andscience always receivesaboost whenatechnical breakthrough for the first timebringsapreviously unobserved entity into the realm ofobservation. For example, Mendelpostulated 'units ofheredity' on the basisofhis plant-breedingobservations,but theseideaswerefelt to be on afirmerfootingonce newtechnologymade itpossibleto see chromosomesandgenes. Thus,scientists are forced somewhatgrudgingly to accept the need for postulatingunobservables. And becausescience -likeall humaninstitutions -issubjecttoswingsoffashion,the willingness to countenance unobservabletheoreticalentitiesfluctuateso vert ime. For reasons which wea reunableto describe here, but which wererooted int he growingc risiso fc lassicalp hysicst hatw ouldc ulminatei nt he birthofquantum theory andrelativity theory,the latenineteentha nde arly twentiethc entury wasa periodd uringwhich scientists wereparticularly intolerant ofunobservables. The importance ofobservation becamee nshrined int he assumption knownas operationism.Thisisthe idea thattheoreticalconcepts areonly meaningful to the extent thattheycanbe exhaustively analysed interms ofthingsthatcanbe observed.
3.3.2Back to behaviourism
The biasagainst unobservablesaffected all the traditionals ciencesanda lso the newer,a spirant scientific discipliness uch asp hysiologyandpsychology. The introspectionists,withtheir'observations' ofconsciousness,had responded to it,but the intellectualclimateseems to haveb eenespecially suited to propagatinga n emphasisonwhatcouldbepublicly observed.Withthe declineofintrospectionism, behaviourism wastakenupenthusiastically,first inthe USA andthenmorewidely.
Whileb ehaviourists could, perhaps,c oncede the existence ofc onsciousness whilearguingthatitwasnot appropriatefor scientific study,atleast someofthem felt thato perationism committed themt ot he strongerclaimt hatt alk of consciousness wasn ot evenm eaningful. Of course, behaviourism hasn everbeen asingleview,andsince the timeofW atson andThorndikebehaviourists ofvarious hueh avemodified theirp ositions. Skinner,f or example, conceded thatinternal mentalevents,i ncludingc onscious experiences,might exist (indeed theyw ere construed asforms ofcovert behaviour). But despitethisrejection ofoperationism, evenSkinners till thoughtt hatt alk ofi nternalevents shouldb ea voided withina scientific psychology.
You mightthink thatavoidingtalk ofinternalevents mightmakeitimpossibleto explainm any,or evenm ost,psychologicalp henomena.However,b ehaviourists werec oncerned to show how evencomplexp henomenamightbe understoodi n terms ofprinciplesoflearning, withbehaviour seenasmade up oflearned responses to particulars timuli.Oneviewo flanguage production,f or example, wast hatt he utterance ofawordcouldbeseenasalearned response.The utterance ofawhole sentence couldb eseenasinvolvingachaino fstimulus-responsepairs,i nw hich each response(the utterance ofaword)also servesasthe stimulus thatleadstothe production ofthe next response(the next word).
Despitethe possibility ofgivingbehaviourist explanations ofcomplexactivities such ast he utterance ofasentence, behaviourists tended not to offeraccounts of whatwenow refertoashighermentalprocesses-processessuch asproducingand understandinglanguage, planning, problemsolving, remembering, payingattention, consciousness andso on. Asthe years passed, however,somepsychologists cameto see thisasamajor failing.
3.4T he return ofthe cognitive
In1 948, atameetingknown ast he Hixon symposium,K arl Lashleygaveatalk entitled 'The problemofserialorderinbehaviour' (Lashley,1951) . Inthis,hegave prominence to the problems posed for behaviourist accounts bycomplexactions in which behaviour segments aresomehow linked togetherinasequence, andwhere two segments dependupon onea nother,e vent hough theym aybe separated by many interveningsegments. Language, asyou mighthaveguessed, providesaprime example.Infact,the last sentence illustratesthe point nicely:whenIcameto write the word'provides' inthe previous sentence Ichoseto enditwiththe letter's'. Idid so,ofcourse, becausethisverbhastoagree grammatically withthe singularnoun 'language',the subjectofthe sentence.Inmyactualsentence, thesetwo wordswere separated byaclause, andso my action atthe timeofwritingthe word'provides' depended upon amuch earlierbehaviour segment -my writingofthe word 'language'. Lashleyargued thatsince the production ofsomewordsinasequence couldbeshown to dependupon wordsproduced much earlier,the simpleviewthat each wordisthe stimulus thatproducesthe subsequent wordasaresponsecouldnot properly explainlanguage production.
He also argued thatmany behaviour sequencesareexecuted simply too rapidly for feedbackfrom onesegment to serveasthe triggerfor the next. He cited examples such asthe speed withwhich pianists andtypists sometimesmovetheirfingers,or withwhich tennisplayers adjust theirwholepostureinresponseto anincomingfast service.Lashley'salternativeto the chainingofbehaviour segments wastosuppose thatcomplexsequencesareplanned andorganized inadvance ofbeinginitiated.The speech errors discussed inChapter7ofthisbook provide especially compelling examplesofthe kindofplanningandorganization thatunderlie skilled behaviour.
Lashley'sv iewt hatbehaviourism couldnot properly explainhow people produce (or comprehend)l anguage wasl aterr einforced byareviewo fS kinner's book Ve rbalBehavior (1957) byt he linguist NoamChomsky (1959). Chomsky argued, contrab ehaviourism,thatl anguage couldnot be thoughto fa saseto f learned responsestoasetofstimulus events. Hisargument had anumberofdifferent aspects. For example, he argued thatchildrenseemtoacquiretheirfirst language too effortlessly -ifyou havetried to learn asecondlanguage you canperhaps testifyto the difference betweenl earningafirst andlearningasecondlanguage.Whilethe latters eems to requirei ntensivea nde ffortful study,the formeriss omethingthat pretty much everyonedoeswithout the need for formalschooling.He also argued thatif the behaviourists wereright,thenexposingc hildrent oimpoverished or ungrammaticall anguage shouldh indert heirl earningofthe corrects timulusresponserelationships. Yets tudiess how thatm uch ofthe speech to which young childrenareexposed isindeed ungrammaticalandotherwiseimpoverished, andthis innowayprevents themfrom learningthe grammaroftheirnativetongue.Similarly, he argued thatgeneralintelligence oughtt oinfluence the learningofstimulusresponserelationships. Again,h owever,i ntelligence doesn ot seemt oinfluence whethero rn ot childrenl earn the underlyingg rammaticalr uleso ftheirl anguage. Chomsky presented many otherarguments to the sameeffect,andthough many of thesehavebeenthoughttobe contentious,hisposition wasextremely influentialin settingup analternative, cognitivec onception oflanguage.Most significantly, Chomsky proposed thatlanguage isrule-based andthat,farfrom childrenlearning language byl earningh ow to respondto particulars timuli, theiracquisition of language involvesacquiringi ts rule-base.Ont hisv iew,my beinga bleto write grammaticalsentencesinvolvesdeployingmy (generally implicit,or unconscious) knowledge ofthe ruleso flanguage.Inr eferringto such implicitk nowledge, Chomsky proposed thatanunderstandingofhow peopleproduce, comprehendor acquirelanguage will necessarily involvereference to somethingthatcannot be directly observed -theirknowledge ofthe underlyingrules,or organization,ofthe language.
Although thisemphasiso nt he roleofplanning, organization andrulesint he generation ofbehaviour wastobe hugely influentialfrom the 1950s onwards,these ideasw erec ertainly not newt op sychology. Asm entioned previously,the gestalt psychologists had drawn attention earlierint he century to the importance of patterning, or organization,f or perception,a ndthe samepoint wasalso made in relation to action. Someonewhohaslearned to singor hum atunecanvery probably manage to whistlei tt hereafter. Yets inging, humminga ndwhistlingc all for very different sequencesofmusclemovements. Thisindicatesthatlearningatunemust involvelearningaseto fa bstractr elationships betweenn otesw hich canbe instantiated asany ofavariety ofmuscularproductions. Asimilaridea, thatwhatis learned must oftenbe morea bstractt hans traightforwardstimulus-response connections,wasalsoexpressed byt he schoolo f'cognitiveb ehaviourists' associated withT olman ( 1932) . Rats thathad learned, for example, repeatedly to turn leftinamazeto findfoodwereshown to swimleftwhenthe mazewasflooded. Since the musclemovements ofrunninga ndswimminga rec ompletely different from oneanother,the rats must clearly havelearned somethingmoreabstractthana particularchainofmuscularresponses.
Evenbeforethe writingso fthe gestalt psychologists or the work ofT olman, psychologists studyingthe acquisition ofskills had realized the importance of planningandorganization for the production ofskilled behaviour,such asinmorse telegraphyortyping(BryanandHarter,1899). Atthe timeofthe Hixon symposium, therefore, therewerealreadyexistingtraditions withinpsychologyupon which the renewed interest int he planninga ndstructureofb ehaviour couldd raw. And, of course, the intellectualclimateofthe mid twentiethcentury waschangingrapidly in many otherways too. Newtechnologieswereinfluencingthe ability ofscientists to conceptualizethe workingso fc omplexs ystems. Oneofthe most crucialissues related to the typeofcausalexplanation thatisappropriateto explainthe behaviour ofsuch asystem. Purposive, or teleological,explanations had beentaboo inWestern science since the timeofthinkers such asGalileoandNewton. Where, for example, anancient Greekphilosophermighthavesaid thatastonefalls to earth'inorderto' reach its naturalrestingplace atthe centreofthe earth(which wasalso the centreof the Greekuniverse),Newton said thatthe stonefalls becauseitisacted upon bythe force ofg ravity.The strategyo fe xplainingphenomenai nt erms ofc ausest hat precede and'push'theireffects,ratherthaninterms ofgoals,or finalstates,towards which events are'pulled',had proved highly successful inthe physicalsciences. The movef romgoal-directed,purposivee xplanations to mechanicalcause-effect explanations wasu sually considered to be amovef rom prescientific, animistic thinkingto properscientific thinking.Behaviourism was,andstill is,anattempt to bringpsychologyinto stepwiththiswayofanalysingphenomena.Astrictemphasis on anorganism'shistory ofconditioningallows anexplanation ofbehaviour interms ofprior causesr athert hano ff utureg oals.However,the development of progressively morec omplexartificialdevicess tarted to call into question the universalapplicability ofe xplanations int erms only ofprior causes. Itbecame increasingly cleart hat,whilethe functioningofthe mechanicalp arts ofa ny such system can be explained incause-effectterms,such explanations will nevercapture the function (or purpose)ofthe wholesystem.
Centralt ot he newk indofa pparently purposivemachines( knownas servomechanisms) wasareliance on feedbackl oops. Feedback isinformation about the match or mismatch betweenadesired goal-stateandanexistingstateof affairs. The classic examplei st he domestic centralheatingsystem,i nw hich the thermostatsettingselected bythe householderisthe goal-stateandthe temperature measured byanairt hermometerist he existingstate.The two arec ompared mechanically.If the existingtemperaturei sl ess thant he desired temperature, this negativef eedbackist ransmitted to the boilercontrols causingthe boilert obe switched on. The boilercontinuestofireuntilinformation hasbeenfed backtothe boilercontrols thatthe discrepancybetweenthe actualanddesired temperatureshas beeneliminated.The systemasawholeexhibits asimplebut dynamic behaviour, withthe boilerturningon andoff inamannerthatmaintains room temperatureator aboutt he desired level. Importantly,the function ofmaintainingasteady temperaturecannot be localized to any onecomponent ofthe heatingsystem,such asthe thermostat,the thermometer,the boilerorits controls,but isaproperty ofthe system-asawhole.
Farmorecomplicated servomechanisms withmorecomplexfeedbackcontrols werealso beingdeveloped.Anti-aircraftgunnery maynot seemvery pertinent to an understandingofa nimalandh umanbehaviour,b ut itw asp artly asaresult of workingon gunnery problems int he SecondW orldW art hatt he mathematician Norbert Weinerdeveloped the notion of'cybernetics',the science ofself-governing, or goal-directed, systems. Accurateanti-aircraftgunnery requiresthataprojectileis fired, andtimed to explode, not atthe present location ofthe targetaircraftbut atits futurelocation. Thismeans not only predictingthe futureposition ofthe planebut also rotatingthe gun so itfacesint he appropriated irection andwiththe correct elevation. Clearly,h umans successfully extrapolatefl ightp athsanda imatfuture positions when,f or example, shootingg ameb irds. However,f or planesflyinga t evergreaterheights andspeeds,c alculation ofthe necessary trajectory ofthe projectilee xceedshumancapabilitiesandmustbe computed automatically. Moreover,usingmotors to moveagun weighingmany tons isavery different matterfrom movingashotgun,or indeed ab ow anda rrow,h eldi ny our arms. Although wearemostly unconscious ofit,normalbodily movement isbased upon continuous muscle, tendon andvisualfeedbackabout how the movement is proceeding.Unless similarfeedbackisdesigned into the gun control system,the swinginganti-aircraftgun mayeasily undershoot or overshoot the intended position, particularly as,d ependingon the airt emperature, the greasepacked roundthe mechanism will be moreor less 'stiff'. Apply too littlepowerandthe gun will undershoot the intended position,asecondpushwill be required andthe gun will 'stutter' towardsits position. Apply too much force andthe gun will overshoot,and will haveto be pulled back,i nw hatcant urn into aserieso fi ncreasingly wild oscillations. Engineers discovered thatthe smoothest performance wasachieved by usingfeedbackloops to dynamically control the turningforce applied to the gun.
Weiner,a ndothercyberneticists such asAshby,recognized the importance of feedbackandself-correction int he functioningofthesenewandc omplex technologicaldevices,andtheyalso sawanalogieswithcomplexnaturalsystems. Weinerdrewp arallels betweent he effects ofc ertainn eurologicalconditions and damage to the feedbackcontrol ofbehaviour.For example, the tremors observed in Parkinsonianpatients werelikened to the oscillations ofananti-aircraftgun whenits movement isinsufficiently 'damped'byfeedbackcontrol.
Animportant intellectualleapfor cognitivepsychologycamewiththe realization thatjust the samekindofanalysiscanbe applied atany levelofbehaviouralcontrol. Ino therw ords,i tisn ot just automatic homeostatic functions or unconsciously executed movements thatcanbe analysed int erms off eedbackl oops but any function/behaviour from the wholly non-conscious to the fully conscious and intended. Miller etal .( 1960) developed the notion off eedbackcontrol into the hypothesist hatbehaviour (ofa nimals,h umans or machines) canbe analysed into whattheycalled TOTE units.TOTE standsfor Test-Operate-Test-Exit. Atest isa comparison betweenacurrent stateandagoal-state.If adiscrepancyisregistered, somerelevant operation intended to reduce the discrepancywill be performed (e.g. switch on the boiler). Asecondtest,or comparison,i st henconducted.If a discrepancyremains,the operation canbe repeated, followed byanothertest. If the discrepancyhasbeeneliminated, the systemexits the TOTE unit.
Miller etal .conceived ofthe TOTE unitasanadvance on the conditioned reflex notion ofPavlov andthe conditioned responsenotion ofWatson andSkinner,bothof which canbe conceptualized asTOTEs. The aimwastodevelop aunitofanalysisof behaviour thatcoulda pply to everythingf rom ad og's conditioned salivatory responseto deliberate, planned action. The TOTE providesabasic pattern inwhich plans arecast; the test phasespecifieswhatknowledge isnecessary for acomparison to be made, andthe operation phasespecifiesw hatt he organism doesabout the outcomeofthe comparison. Although thisschememakesitp ossibleto talk about purposiveb ehaviour,a nda bout unobservableg oals andc omparison operations, thereiscontinuity from behaviourism. Cognitivepsychologygenerally attempts to retainthe scientific rigour ofbehaviourism whileatthe sametimeescapingfrom the behaviouristic restrictions inrelation to unobservables.
Animportant property ofTOTEsisthattheycanbe nested withinhierarchies. The operation segment ofany TOTE canitselfbecomposed ofoneor moreTOTE units. For example, the TOTE for startingthe carm ightbe nested withint he operation ofalargerTOTE for drivingto the shops,which mightitselfb enested withinastill largerunithavingthe goalofbuyingapresent. Thisnestingoffeedback loop units providesawayt oconceptualizeh ow behaviour canbe complexly structured.Int hiss cheme, moment-to-moment control ofb ehaviour passesin sequence betweenaserieso fT OTEg oal-states,withthe TOTE units themselves nested inhierarchies. Miller etal .explicitly likened this' flow ofc ontrol' of behaviour to the wayinwhich control inac omputerprograms witchesinorderly fashion from commandlineto commandlinea st he execution ofa ny particular subroutinei scompleted.( Note: what' flows' aroundaTOTE canbe energy, information or,atthe highest levelofconceptualabstraction,control.)
Computers andthe mind
Anotherdevelopment int he mid twentiethc entury withahuge import for the development ofcognitivepsychologywasthe openingup ofanewfieldconcerned withthe possibility ofdesigningandthenbuildingcomputers. Buildingon earlier work thatdeveloped af ormal,or mathematicalapproach to logicalr easoning, Claude Shannon in1 938showed how corea spects ofreasoningc ouldb e implemented ins implee lectricalcircuits. Int he 1940s,M cCulloch andP itts showed how itw asp ossibleto modelt he behaviour ofsimple(andi dealized) neurons interms oflogic.Takentogether,thesedevelopments suggested something thatatt he timeseemed extraordinary -thatt he brain'sactivity could, atl east in principle, be implemented bysimpleelectricalcircuits.
Inp arallelw iththesed evelopments,the 1930s and1940s sawp ioneering theoreticaldevelopments incomputation andi nformation processing.Turing, in 1936,d eveloped anabstracts pecification for amachine(aT uringmachine)t hat couldc omputea ny function thatinp rinciplec ouldb ec omputed.Int he 1940s, Shannon andW eaverused the tools ofmathematicstoproposeaformalaccount of information,andofhow itcouldbetransmitted.
Technologicalp rogress wasalso rapid.In1 941,K onrad ZuseofB erlin developed the world's first programmable, general-purposec omputer. In1 943, Colossus,aspecial-purposec omputerdesigned to breakw artimec odes,b ecame operationalatBletchleyPark,i nBuckinghamshire.In1 946,J ohnv on Neumann articulated aseto fa rchitecturalp roposals for designingprogrammable, generalpurposec omputers. Thesewerea dopted almost universally andc omputers have since also beenk nown asv on Neumann machines. In1 948, the Manchester University Mark Iprogrammable, general-purposec omputerbecameoperational and, in1 951,F errantiL tdb eganp roducing, sellinga ndi nstallingversions ofthe ManchesterMark I-the world's first commercially available, programmable, general-purposecomputer.
Thesed evelopments,f ascinatingthough theyw erei nt heiro wn right,a lso seemed to carry important implications for our understandingandstudyofthe mind. Theyappeared to show,for instance, thatreasoning, acentralfeatureofthe human mind, couldbeimplemented inadigitalcomputer. If thatwerethe case, thennot only couldthe computerbe used asatool to aid our understandingofthe mind, but the question wouldalso ariseastowhethermindsandcomputers areessentially alike. Indeed, in1950,Turingproposed atest -the Turingtest -bywhich he thoughtwe shouldjudge whethertwo entitieshavethe sameintelligence.Turingbelieved that, shouldthe situation everarisewherebywecouldnot distinguishthe intelligence ofa humanfrom the 'intelligence'o fac omputer,thenw eoughtt oconcede thatboth were equally intelligent. Moreover,since wea rei nagreement thathumans are capableofthought,wea lso oughtt oconcede thatcomputers area lso capableof thought!Box 1.4(overleaf)outlinesthe Turingtest andconsiders whatitmighttake for ittobe passed.
Turing's position remains controversial,ofcourse, though itcertainly captured the imagination ofthe time.In1 956,a tt he DartmouthC onference (heldi n Dartmouth, NewHampshire),J ohnMcCarthycoined the phrase'Artificial Intelligence'( or AI). He founded AI labsatMIT in1957,andthenatStanfordin 1963,a ndso begananewacademic discipline, predicated on the possibility that humans arenot the only onescapableofexhibitinghuman-likeintelligence.
You havenow beenintroduced to avariety ofthe influencest hatgot om ake up cognitivepsychology. Cognitivepsychologyinherits someofthe behaviourist concerns withscientific method.Throughout thisbook you will see thatalmost constant reference ism ade to systematic observations ofh umanbehaviour (and sometimesanimalbehaviour too). Almost every chapterwill present the results of empiricalinvestigations,a ndthesea ref undamentalinguidingour understanding. But cognitivepsychologyr ejects the exclusivef ocus on whatiso bservable.As Chomsky implied, understandingthe mindrequiresu st oconsiderw hatl ies behindb ehaviour -to ask whatr uleso rp rocessesgovern the behaviour we observe.Each chapterw ill also considert he extent to which weunderstandh ow the mindprocessesinformation,a ndh ow thatinformation isr epresented. Cognitivepsychologyalso hasamajor commitment to the useofc omputers asa device for aidingour understandingofthe mind.First,c omputers areused as research equipment to control experiments,to present stimuli, to recordresponses andto tabulatea nda nalysed ata.Second, computers area lso used asaresearch tool -i fwec animplement reasoningi nac omputer,f or example, wemaygain insightinto how reasoningmightbe implemented int he brain. So,most ofthe
TheT uringtest:c ancomputers think?
Turingproposed thatw ec ould determinewhetherac omputercant hinkb y judgingwhetherits ucceedsinw hathe called the imitation game.Int he game therea rethree participants,two humans ( A and B )andacomputer( C ). The arrangement ofthe participants andthe communication flow betweent hem is schematicallyindicated inFigure1.3.
Theparticipantsarepositioned in separaterooms,so each oneisunable to see,h earo rt ouch the others. However,oneofthe humanp articipants( A )isconnected via aV DU terminal connection to the otherhumanp articipant ( B )anda lso to the computer( C ). A cancommunicate electronicallyw ithb oth B and C .The goal for A istoascertainwhich of B and C ist he computer,a ndwhich the human. The goal of B ,the otherhuman, ist oassist A inmakingthe correct identification (perhaps byt ryingto appearashumanasp ossible). C 's goal, by contrast,i st olead A into makingthe wrongi dentification (byimitatingh uman behaviour). C wins the game if A cannot reliablyidentify C ast he computer. Turing's claimwast hatif ac omputercould simulateh umanbehaviour so successfullythatanotherhumancould not tell thatitwasacomputer,thenthe computercould legitimatelybe saidto think. chapters inthisbook will also discuss ways inwhich researchers haveused computer models to help us understandh ow the mindprocessesandrepresents information whenp eopleperformcertainbehaviours.Third, andmorec ontroversially, computers area lso considered to be candidate'thinkers' int heiro wn right. Understandingmorea bout the natureofc omputation itselfmays hed lighto nt he natureofthinking, andon the natureofthe mind.
Summary ofSection 3
. Cognitivepsychologyinherits some ofthe behaviourist concerns withscientific method.Almost every chapterint hisbookpresents the results ofe mpirical investigations,investigations thatarefundamental inguidingour understanding.
. Cognitivepsychologyrejects anexclusivefocus on whatisobservable.Almost every chapterconsiders the extent to which weunderstandh ow the mind processesinformation,andhow thatinformation isrepresented.
. Cognitivepsychologyiscommitted to usingcomputers asatoolfor aidingour understandingofthe mind.
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Figure1.3 The arrangement ofthe participants inTuring's imitation game
. Introspectionist andgestaltist interest inconscious experience wasreplaced by the behaviourist focus on whatispubliclyobservable.
. Thereisalways atension inscience betweenthe emphasisonobservation and the need to postulateunobservable theoretical entities.
. Behaviourists did not necessarilydeny the importance ofhighermental functions,but rarelyoffered accounts ofthem.
. Cognitivepsychologyhasmany roots; ithasbeenheavilyinfluenced by technological developments andthe waytheyhelpustounderstandcomplex behaviours.
4S cience, models andthe mind
If cognitivepsychologyisconcerned withthe processesandrepresentations ofthe mind, andthesecannot be directly observed, how cancognitivepsychologists bridge the gap? How dow especulatea bout the natureofsomethingwec annot observe, whileremainingscientific?Therearebroadly three kindsofanswer. First,a sw eh avea lreadydiscussed, scientific theoriescommonly invoke unobservabletheoreticalentitiestoaccount for observationaldata(e.g.force fields, electron energylevels,genesorcognitiveoperations).
The seconda nswerbuildso nt he first. Whenatheory hypothesizesan unobservable, theoreticalconstruct,amodelneedstobe specified ofthe relationship betweent he constructandthe behaviour to be explained.Itw ouldh aveb een insufficient for Newton to havetried to explainwhythingsfall to Earthbysimply invokingthe notion ofgravitation. He went furtherandderived equations to model the effects ofgravity,which canbe used to generatepredictions about how gravity oughttowork for thingswhosemotion hasnot yetbeensystematically observed.So physicists couldthenperform studiesinordertoconfirm the predictions (thatis,until Einstein'stheoriesofrelativity,but thatisanotherstory).
Cognitivepsychologyproceedsinasimilarway. Consideragainthe exampleof language.Cognitivepsychologists havemade numerous detailed observations ofthe production (andcomprehension) oflanguage (you canfinddiscussions ofthesein Chapters 6and7). Explainingtheseobservations,h owever,seems to require positingthingsinternalt ot he mindthatarei nvolved inp roducingthe observed behaviour.Thesea rethe unobservable, theoreticalconstructs ofmentalp rocesses andstructures. Positingthese, ofcourse, isjust the startingpoint. The challenge for cognitivepsychologists hasbeentosaymore.Theyhaveto develop models ofthese mentalstructuresandprocesses,show how theygiveriseto the observed behaviour, and, importantly,show how successfully theypredictbehaviour thathasnot yetbeen systematically studied inexperiments.
Developingamodelisn ot easy; Newton apparently needed the inspiration provided byanapplef allingto Earth(or so the story goes). Andmuch ofthe challenge facingc ognitivepsychologistsist oharness theircreativity and imagination inordertosuggest plausiblemodels. Throughout your readingofthis book,you mightwishto considerhow you wouldhaveresponded to someofthe problems described.You mightwant to considerwhatwouldconstrainyour choice ofmodel,whatkindsofmodelyou wouldhavedeveloped, andhow you wouldhave setabout doingthis. Without doubt,thesearedifficult questions -so don'tlosetoo much sleepo vert hem!-b ut theyatl east serveto show how creativec ognitive psychologyis. Creativetoo isthe matterofdevisingstudiesinordertoevaluatea model. Byw orkingout the predictions amodelm ightm ake, psychologists can evaluateitbydevisingstudiestotest its predictions,andbythenmakingthe relevant behaviouralobservations.
Creatingmodels andd esigningstudiest ot est themisn ot easy,b ut cognitive psychologists canusecomputers to help. The previous section suggested two ways inw hich computers arei mportant to cognitivepsychologyo thert hanas experimentalequipment -c omputers mightbe capableofthought; andtheycan also serveastools for implementingmodels such asamodeloflanguage processes. Now,perhaps,you cansee how theymightcontributeto the scientific objectivesof cognitivepsychology-researchers canusecomputers inordertocreatemodels. Just ascomputerprogrammers canbuildprograms to dothingssuch aswordprocessing, or financialaccounts,so researchers incognitivepsychologycanp rogram computers to behaveaccordingto aparticularmodelofthe mind.Usingcomputers to programparticularmodels canbe helpful on anumberofcounts: 1Models canr apidly becomevery complicated -too complicated to be expressed verbally,or for oneperson to holda ll the relevant details inm ind. Thisp roblemaffects others too -meteorologists increasingly usec omputer models ofweathers ystems,a nde conomists usec omputerm odels ofthe economy.The phenomenai nvolved areso complicated that,without computers,theywouldbealmost impossibleto model. 2Itisn ot always easy to work out the predictions ofamodel. Programminga modelcanallow researchers to simulatethe effects ofdifferent conditions and so findout how the modelbehaves,a ndwhethert hisbehaviour accurately predicts how humans will behave.
3Perhaps most important ofa ll,b yp rogrammingamodelinto ac omputer researchers candeterminewhetherthe modelisinternally consistent (whether therearestatements inthe modelthatcontradictoneanother),andwhetherthe modelisalreadyclearly andprecisely stated.If itis,the computerp rogram will run; otherwise, itwill crash.
Socognitivepsychologycanp ositt he existence ofunobservable(cognitive) processesandstructuresandstill be scientific.Not only ist hist rueofother disciplineslikephysicsandchemistry,but,likethosedisciplines,the gapbetween observableb ehaviour andunobservableprocessesandstructurescanbe bridged via the creation andevaluation ofmodels. Thereis,however,anewpossibility for linkingcognitiveprocesseswithafocus on observation,a ndthisl eadst ot he thirda nswert ot he question withwhich this section began. The advent ofnewtechniquesfor imagingthe brainsuggests that,just possibly,mentalprocessesandstructuresmaynot be entirely unobservable(asthe behaviourists once believed).
FunctionalMRI studies(andotherkindsofimaging)allow us to see which parts ofthe brainbecomee specially activewhenp eoplea ree ngaged inac ertaint ask (relativeto whent heyaree ngaged ins omec ontrol task or tasks). Therei s considerabled ebatei nt he cognitivec ommunity ast ot he usefulness ofi maging techniquesfor helpingresearchers to develop theoriesofcognition. Activity 1.3 will help you getasenseofthe issuesinvolved.
ACTIVITY 1.3
Consideragainthe brainimagesincolour Plates1and2. First,thinkabout whatyou could inferfromthe imagesalone.Whatdoesthe indication ofactivity inparticular brainr egions tell you? Second, thinka bout the processesgoingon inside participants' minds. Whatadditional information would you need to be able to say whatt he brainactivity represents?Supposeyou wereg ivenv ery detailed anatomical descriptions ofthe activeregions:whatw ould thatenable you to conclude?
COMMENT
Itisonethingto saythatt hereisactivity inparticularregions ofthe brain,yetquite anothertosayexactlywhatcognitiveprocessesandstructuresareinvolved.Animage ofb rainactivity,on its own,d oesn ot helpv ery much.Seemingly,whatiscrucially needed isfurtherinformation astowhatinformation each brainregion processes. That is,weneed to know the function ofthe activeregions. Onewayoftryingto identifythe function ofdifferent brainregions istocomparebrainimagesfor different kindsoftask -regions thatareactivefor all tasksmaybe implicated ininformation processingthatis common to thosetasks. Thisassumesw eh aveg oodm odelsfor the informationprocessingc haracteristicso fd ifferent tasks. If so,a nda lso usinga natomical and neuropsychological evidence, researchers cant hent entativelybegint oidentify particularr egions withparticularfunctions. Thisint urn canhelpr esearchers to interpretanddesignfurtherbrain-imagingstudies.
Onecriticism ofimagingstudiesisthat,atbest,theyhelp researchers to localizea particularfunction -thatis,researchers canidentifythe function withaparticular region ofthe brain-but thattheydonot improveour theoriesofcognition. However, thisisab itl ikesayingthatbeinga bleto see chromosomesandg enesdown a microscopedoesnot improvethe theory ofgenetic inheritance.Inonesensethatis true, but makingvisibleentitiesthatwerepreviously only theoreticaldoesincrease overall confidence int he theory.Similarly,supposeacognitivetheory says that readingsomewordsinvolvesu singavisualp rocessingroutea ndreadingother wordsinvolvesusinganauditory processingroute.Findingthatthe first task induced activity inareasknown to be engaged byothervisualtasks,andthatthe secondtask induced activity inareasknown to be engaged byauditory tasks wouldincreaseour confidence inthe theory.
Without prejudgingthe ongoingd ebatei nt hisarea, itisl ikely thatimaging techniquesw ill contributeto cognitivetheory inv arious ways. Sometimest he contribution will be atthe leveloftheoreticaldeduction,sometimesitmaybe ata less palpablelevelaswhenitaddstothe confidence inatheory.Whengeneswere first made visible, genetic engineeringwasavery distant prospect,but itishardto imaginethe latterwithout the former. The advancesincognitivesciencestowhich neuroimagingwill contributeareequally hardto predict,but weshall be surprised if theydonot proveto be many andvaried.
Summary ofSection 4
. Cognitivepsychologycanbe scientific, while beinginterested inwhatgoeson, unseen,inside the mind, for anumberofreasons: -othernatural sciencesinvoke unobservable entitiesandarenot asa consequence rendered unscientific -l ike othersciences,cognitivepsychologyproceedsbymodelling unobservablestoproduce predictions which canbe tested byconducting appropriatestudies -the advent ofbrain-imagingtechnology,though undoubtedlycontentious, raisest he prospecto fobservingprocessest hatw erepreviously unobservable.
5T he cognitivea pproach
Thus far,wehavetalked ofcognitivestructuresandcognitiveprocesses. Section 3 offered someexamplesofhistoricalproposals astowhatkindsofthingscognitive structuresandprocessesare.Contemporary cognitivepsychologyequates representations withc ognitivestructures,a ndc omputationso vert hesewith cognitiveprocesses.
Representation
We haveemphasized the scientific natureofcognitivepsychology. However, Fodor (1974) argued thatp sychologym ightbe aspecials cience -specialbecausei ts subjectmatter,the mind, standsinacomplexrelation to the material,physicalworld -andthereforetakesadifferent form from the naturalorsocialsciences. Spellingout the relationshipbetweenthe mindandthe physicalworld, evenbetweenthe mind andthe body,isextremely difficult. Two competingintuitions haveguided people's thinkingabout the issue.Oneisthatthe mindtranscendsthe physicalbody(andthe brain) -thatwhenwesayweareinlove, for example, wemeanmorethanthatweare inaparticularbodily or brainstate.Though you maysharethisintuition,itisdifficult indeed to saywhatapsychologicalstateisif itis not physical. Itisalso difficult to reconcilethisintuition withthe methodso fnaturalscience -h ow isitp ossibleto studysomethingscientifically if itisnot physicalinnature?The competingintuition isthatall aspects ofhumanity,includingour minds,oughttobe explicableasparts of the naturalworld, andso explicablebythe naturalsciences. Humans are, afterall, products ofnatural,evolutionary pressures,shaped bythe worldinwhich wehave evolved.How couldwecometo possess amindthatcouldnot be explained aspart of the natural,physicalworld? The tension betweenthesetwo intuitions isrealanddifficult to resolve(asyou will see from Chapters 15a nd17). Herewec andon om orethanhint att he difficulties. Onefeatureofthe mindmaygosomewaytoshowingwhythe intuitions areso difficult to reconcile.Itisthe featureofrepresentation.
Somethingsint he worldh avethe property ofb eing'about' somethinge lse. Books,for example, tendto be about otherthings. Abook on the SecondWorldWar isabout precisely that-the realevents thatgotomakeup the SecondW orldW ar. The observation issomundanethatyou mayneverhavegivenitasecondthought. Yett hisp roperty of aboutness isq uitee xtraordinary,a ndc ertainly difficult to explainw ithint he naturals ciences. Ab ook,f or example, couldb ed escribed physically interms ofthe arrangements ofits molecules,the kindsofatoms thatit comprises,i ts chemicalcompounds. We couldd escribe its mass andvolume, and measureitfor electricalandmagnetic properties. Yet,thesedescriptions produce no hint astoabook'ssubjectmatter. Only whenthe patterns ofink areconsidered, not aspatterns ofink,but as words ,doesitbecomeclearwhatabook isabout.
Few,ifany,thingsinthe naturalworldhavethisproperty ofaboutness. Itmakes no senseto ask whatastoneisabout,or whatariverisabout. Whileitmakessenseto ask whatab ook or anewspaperisabout,i tm akesn os enseto ask whatits components,the ink andpaper,areabout. It does makesenseto ask whatmentalor cognitiveprocessesareabout -weoftensaytooneanother'whatareyou thinking about?' Onewayofexpressingthe aboutness ofmentalprocessesistosaythatthey involve representations -our thoughts represent possiblestateso fa ffairs,our perceptions represent our immediatee nvironment (generally,though not always, accurately).
Therepresentationalq uality ofmentalp rocessesw asdescribed byt he philosophero fpsychologyFranz Brentano (1838 Brentano ( -1917 . Brentano believed that mentals tatescomprisemental acts andmental contents.So,f or example, my believingthatRosie, my petcat,i sl azy isamentals tate-Ia mint he stateof believingthatRosie islazy.For Brentano,the statehasadualcharacter:itcomprises anact,correspondingto the actofbelieving, andacontent,namely the content that Rosie islazy.Brentano thoughtthatmentalstatescandiffer,evenif theyinvolvethe samementalact. So,for example, my believingthatRosie islazy,andmy believing thatall cats arelazy,wouldrepresent two different mentals tates. The samea ctis common to both, but the beliefsared ifferentiated byt heircontent:onei s about Rosie, the otheris about all cats.
The consequence for Brentano wasthatpsychologyneedstoconsidernot only the internalfeaturesofthe mindor brain,but also whatthesefeaturesareabout or represent int he world.Perhaps now you cans ee whyitisn ot straightforwardto decide whatk indofscience cognitivepsychologyis. Whereasp hysicsand chemistry studythe materialworldofatoms andmolecules(which donot havethis representationalq uality),c ognitivepsychologys tudiesm entals tatesw hose representationaln aturec annot be ignored.Consequently,c ognitivepsychology studiessomethingintrinsically relational-somethingthatspans whatisinthe mind andwhatitr elatest oint he world.Indeed, the issueofrepresentation tendst o distinguishthe socials ciences( such ass ociology) from the naturals ciences( like physics). Cognitivepsychology,f ocusingon bothwhatisr epresented (the world) andwhatdoesthe representing(the mind),doesnot fall neatly into eithercategory.
Computation
InSection 3weconsidered someofthe technologicalandtheoreticalantecedents to cognitivepsychology. Whatemerged from the advancesconcerningtheorieso f information andcomputation wasthe viewthatcomputers process information,and provide ameans for modellingandunderstandingthe mind.AsDavid Marr put it,'If ... vision isreally aninformation processingtask,thenIshouldbeableto makemy computerdoit...' (Marr,1982,p.4 ).
Marr's statement hints atadeeprelation betweenthe computerandthe mind.If computers process information,a ndi nformation processingi sw hatcharacterizes minds,perhaps,atsomedeeplevel,the mindiscomputational. Thisclaimprovidesa furtherk eyassumption ofthe cognitiveapproach: cognitivepsychologists tendto viewthe mindascomputational,aswell asrepresentational.
Von Eckardt( 1993) suggests thatt herea retwo assumptions involved in construingthe minda scomputational. First,i salinkinga ssumption -the assumption thatt he mindi sac omputationaldevice ofsomekind, andthatits capacitiesarecomputationalcapacities. The assumption servestolink minds(things which wewishto understandbetter) withcomputers (thingswhich arealreadywell understood). Second, isthe systemassumption:thisfleshesout whatismeant bya computationaldevice.Generally,the assumption tendst obe thatcomputers are systems thatrepresent information,input,store, manipulateandoutput representations,andoperateaccordingto rules. The two assumptions work togethertoprovide aframework for understandingthe (relatively) unknown mindinterms ofthe known computer.
Just asw iththe representationalassumption,the assumption thatm indsare computationalr aisesm any questions. Oneofthe morepressingf or cognitive psychologyhasbeenthe preciseform thatcomputationalmodels shouldtake.Thisis infactamajor debatewithincontemporary cognitivepsychology,andthe issuewill be referred to ino newayo ranotherinm any chapters int hisbook (especially in Chapters 16 and17). Broadly speaking, therehavebeentwo mainproposals astothe computationalmodels weshoulduseto understandthe mind: symbolic models and connectionist models.
Symbol systems
Onewayo funderstandingthe idea thatt he mindi sbothrepresentationaland computationalhasbeentosuggest thatthe mindisasymbol system. Onthisviewthe representationalq ualitieso fthe minda ree xpressed via the claimt hatt he mindi s symbolic andcontains symbols. So,for example, my mentalstatethatRosie islazy mightbe described asinvolvingsymbols for Rosie andlaziness. The symbols togetherrepresent whatthe belief isabout. Tosaythatthe mindiscomputationalisto sayn oneothert hant he minde mbodies( computational) mechanisms for manipulatingthesesymbolic representations. MybelievingthatRosie islazy would theninvolvemy appropriately manipulatingthe symbol for Rosie andthe symbol for laziness.
Newell andS imon (1976) werethe first to proposethatt he mindi sasymbol system. Intheirview,symbolic representations andtheirmanipulation arethe very buildingblocks ofintelligent thoughtandaction. Newell andSimon proposed many different propertieso fsymbol systems,b ut weneed considero nly af ew. Symbol systems shouldcompriseabasic setofsymbols thatcanbe combined to form larger symbol structures(just asthe symbols for 'Rosie'and'lazy' couldbecombined to form the symbolic expression 'Rosie isl azy'). Symbol systems shouldc ontain processest hato perateon symbol structurest op roduce others ymbol structures. Finally,symbol structuresshouldrepresent,or be about,objects.
Newell andSimon'sproposalthatthe mindisasymbol systemamounts to the claimt hatt he cognitiveprocessest hatu nderlie language, perception,memory, thinking, categorization,a ndproblems olvingwill ultimately turn out to involve processesofmanipulatingandtransformingsymbolic representations. The proposal is,ofcourse, anempiricalone, andinprinciplethe evidence couldturn out either way. Onewayofaddressingthe issueistodevelop models ofsymbol systems and comparethesewithempiricaldata(e.g.from humanparticipants inanexperiment). Asy ou will see throughout thisbook,the strategyofproducingcomputerm odels andcomparingtheirperformance withhumandataisacommon one(see especially Chapter16for such comparisons for symbolic models). However,itisworthnoting thatdisagreement withe mpiricalevidence doesn ot necessarily imply thatt he cognitiveprocessesinq uestion arenot symbolic.Itm ayw ell be thatad ifferent symbolic modelwouldagree withthe datamuch better. So,although the claimthat the mindisasymbol systemisempirical,itwill requireaconsiderableamount of empiricalevidence to show eitherthatthe mindissymbolic or thatitisnot.
Connectionism
Cognitivepsychologists havealso soughttounderstandthe mind's representational andcomputationalqualitiesvia analternativeframework,known asconnectionism.
Connectionist models typically drawtheirinspiration from someofthe known characteristicso fthe brain. So,f or example, weknow thatn eurons areh ighly interconnected.Seemingly theycanpass information on to neurons withwhich they areconnected, eitherthrough inhibitingor enhancingthe activity ofthoseneurons. Theyappeartobe ableto process information inparallel-neurons arecapableof firingc oncurrently.Andtherea remany morepropertiesbesides. Connectionism describesattempts to buildmodels ofcognition out ofbuildingblocks thatpreserve theseimportant propertiesofneuralinformation processing.Typically,researchers simulateconnectionist networks on acomputer,networks thatinvolveanumberof layers ofneuron-likecomputingunits. The appealofconnectionism liesinthe hope thatconnectionist models mayultimately standabetterchance ofbeingsuccessful models ofcognition.
Considerthe process ofconstructingsymbolic andconnectionist models inthe area oflanguage understanding, for example.Asymbolic modellermightfirst seek to understandthe representations involved inunderstandinglanguage.Theymight positsymbolic representations ofwordsandtheirmeaning, ofrulesofgrammar,and so on. Theywouldthenconstructacomputerprogramtoencode the representations andmanipulatethemsothatthe programbehavessensibly.Givenaninput ofwritten language, for example, the programmightgeneratearepresentation ofits meaning.
Thiswouldbeanexceptionally hardtask but,wereittobe successful,wecouldthen comparethe output ofthe programw iththe judgments ofh umanl anguage understanders to see if the programgenerated sensibleanswers.
Incontrast,aconnectionist modeller,though tryingto represent the samekindsof information,wouldd ot hisinad ifferent way. Theyw ouldseekt or epresent information int erms ofneuron-likec omputingunits andtheirinterconnections. Ratherthanfreely writingacomputerprogram,theywouldseektoexplainlanguage understandinginterms ofthe kindsofinformation processingthatthe neuron-like units engage in. Thus connectionists seektorestrictthemselvestomodels thathave someprimaf acie plausibility int erms ofwhatw eknow ofthe informationprocessingpropertiesofthe brain.
Oneofthe excitingfi ndingsassociated withc onnectionism hasbeent hatt his brain-likeinformation processingtendstoproduce interestingcognitiveproperties all on its own (somepropertiesdonot haveto be explicitly programmed, unlikethe caseofsymbolic models). For example, peopletendto be goodatgeneralizingfrom just afewinstances-though inall likelihoodyou haveencountered fewUK Prime Ministers,ifyou wereasked to describe the typicalUK PrimeMinisteryou could probably comeup withasensibleg eneralization (e.g.ambitious,d riven,e tc.). It turns out thatconnectionist models tendto be ableto generalizequitespontaneously, withno need for thiscognitiveproperty to be explicitly programmed.
Thisbriefd iscussion aimed onlyt ointroduce thesed ifferent kindso f computationalmodel; ithasofcourseskated overmany complexities. Inparticular, the question astowhetherthe mindisbettermodelled asasymbol systemorasa connectionist network hasbeenandcontinuestobe hotly debated (see, for example, Fodor andPylyshyn,1988; Smolensky,1987) ,asyou will see especially inChapters 16 and17.
Summary ofSection 5
. Cognitivepsychologyiscommitted to the assumption thatthe mindisboth representational andcomputational.
. Representations areunderstoodashavingaproperty ofaboutness.
. Computations areunderstoodasprocessesofinputting, storing, manipulating andoutputtinginformation.
. Withincognitivepsychology,the mindtendstobe understoodinrelation to eitheroftwo broad conceptions ofcomputation: -c omputation asrule-based, symbolmanipulation -c omputation asneurally-inspired, asinconnectionist networks.
6Level-dependent explanations
Linkingthe mindwithcomputers raisesmany interestingandchallengingquestions. Oneview,commonly attributed to Marr (1982) ,isthatcognition canbe understood at,atleast,three different levels.
6.1Thecomputationallevel
The first ofM arr's level's( level1 )iscommonly referred to ast he computational level. Anexplanation ofc ognition att hisl evels pecifies what ac omputational systemactually computesand why .The specification canbe givenint erms ofa mappingb etweenappropriatesets ofi nputs andtheircorrespondingoutputs. Considerasystemt hatp erforms addition. Alevel1explanation wouldtherefore refertothe 'plus' function,partially indicated inTable1.2. 
6.2Thea lgorithmic level
Marr's level2 ,c ommonly referred to ast he algorithmic level,specifies how a computation ist obe achieved.Alevel2explanation mightdescribethe representations ofinput andoutput thatasystememploys,andthe algorithms that operateovertheserepresentations. For example, incomputingthe 'plus' function, input numbers couldb erepresented inanumbero fd ifferent ways:i ndenary or binary notation,asarabic or romannumerals,or asappropriatenumbers ofdots. The algorithmspecifiesthe steps involved intransformingthe input representations into appropriateoutput representations.
Toreturn to the exampleofaddition,onewayofrepresentingtwo numbers (say, the numbers 2and3) involvesrepresentingtheminterms ofappropriatenumbers of dots (i.e. .. and ...). Onealgorithmfor addingthe numbers mightinvolvemoving the two dots oneatatimeso thattheyareadjacent to the three, to yieldanoutput representation (not dissimilartoaddingusinganabacus). Another(formally) distinct algorithmwouldbeto movethe three dots oneatatimeso thattheyareadjacent to the two. Thesealgorithms,andthe sequence ofsteps theywouldgenerate, areshown inTable1.3. Thisobviously makesitvery difficult for acognitivepsychologist to work out whatalgorithmt ochoosei no rdert om odelhumanp erformance successfully. However,therea reways ofd istinguishingd ifferent algorithms. For example, algorithms canbestow aconsiderablebenefittoanyone(or anything)thatdeploys them:eventhough atask mayappeartobe insoluble, or its solution appeartoimpose impracticaldemandso nr esources,witha ppropriatea lgorithms itm aybe soluble withamodicum ofresources. Notehow algorithm2inTable1.3 completesthe task inoneless stepthanalgorithm1.
Less trivially,considerchess. Onewayofplayingchess wouldbeto considerall possiblemovesbyl ookinga head ac ertainn umbero fsteps. Aso nelooks further ahead, however,the numbero fpossiblemovesgrows exponentially,a ndso this particularstrategywouldrequirevast amounts ofmemory andtime.Bydeploying moresophisticated algorithms,onesinvolvingheuristicsandstrategiesthatrestrict the numberofpossiblemovesthatneed to be considered, the resource demandsof the task fall rapidly.Thus,a ppropriatea lgorithms mayr enders olubletasks that appearinsoluble, anda lso rendert hems olublewithinp racticalr esource limits (Chapter10considers someofthe stratagems ofrealchess experts).
Tosee this,considerdifferent algorithms for multiplying253by375.Oneoption ist oadd 253t oitself375times. Anotherw ouldi nvolvea dding375to itself253 times. Yetanotherwaywouldbeto rememberthe products ofall pairs ofnumbers up to,say,400. The first andsecondalgorithms wouldrequireapencilandpaperanda very large amount oftime.Bycontrast,the thirdstrategywouldpotentially require littletimebut avery large andefficient memory.Abetteralgorithm,perhaps,would involveknowingbyrotesomeproducts (say,56 200 =1,000,3 6 5=15, etc.),and knowingthatthe productasked for canbe decomposed asfollows: 253 6 375=(200 +50+3) 6 (300 +70+5) =200 6 (300 +70+5)+50 6 (300 +70+5)+3 6 (300 +70+5) =(60,000 +14,000 +1,000) +(15,000 +3,500 +250) +(900 +210 +15) =75,000 +18,750+1,125
=94,875
Notethatthisalgorithminvolves some demandsonmemory and some demandson time, but doesn'tplace excessivedemandsoneither.
Returningto our exampleoflanguage understanding, achallenge for acognitive psychologist wouldb eto work out how the inputs andoutputs shouldb e represented, anda lgorithms for convertingthe formerinto the latter. Ac ritical question,however,will remain:whyweretheseparticularrepresentations andthis particularalgorithmchosen,andcouldbetterchoiceshavebeenmade?
6.3Thei mplementationallevel
Marr's level3iscommonly referred to asthe hardwareor implementationallevel. It specifieshow algorithms andrepresentations arephysically realized.Inour example ofaddition,numbers wererealized asmarks on piecesofpaperandmovement of thosemarks. Inad igitalcomputer,a nexplanation att he implementationall evel wouldmakereference to transistors,voltages,c urrents,d iodesandthe like.If addition wereimplemented usinganabacus,anexplanation wouldmakereference to beadsslidingon rods. Wereweto explainhumancognitiveprocessinginterms of Marr's level3,thenwewouldmakereference to neurons,neurotransmitters andthe like.
Explainingc ognitiveprocessinga tt he implementationall evelp resents avery realchallenge.Inour exampleoflanguage understanding, wewouldhaveto make reference to the realneuralcircuits thatimplement language understanding, andto theiractualactivitiesw hilst doingso. Though neuropsychologicalandneuroimaginge vidence, asw ell asn euroscientific advances,a ccumulate, such an explanation exceedsthe abilitiesofour current understanding.
6.4U singMarr's levels
Cognitivepsychologists tendto explaincognition atl evels 1and2. Thatis,they pursue functionalaccounts (atlevel1)and process accounts (atlevel2). Level3 explanations,thosethatrefertoactualneurons,neurotransmitter,andso on,tendto be lefttoneuroscientists.However,thereareimportant relations betweenall three levels. For example, the implementation levelcanconstrainw hatcounts asan appropriatea lgorithm. The brainm ayn ot be ableto implement all algorithms,or mayn ot implement themequally well. Inasense, connectionist models are predicated on thisv iew-thatt he hardwareofthe brainconstrains our choice of algorithm( or level2explanations) to thosethatw eknow the brainisgooda t computing.Certainly if itcouldb eshown thatalevel1or 2account ofsome cognitivephenomenon couldnot be implemented inn euralhardware, thenr eal doubtwouldbecast on the correspondingpsychologicalexplanation.
Thiss ection hasfocused on someofthe foundationalassumptions made in contemporary cognitivepsychology,though very many otherassumptions arealso made, anda lso tendto characterizeacognitivea pproach.Table1.1 inSection 2 listed someofthe morecommon ones,andyou maywishto revisititnow.You may also liketo refertothistableafteryou haveread each ofthe followingchapters to see if you canidentifywhich assumptions havebeenmade, andhow explicitly.
Summary ofSection 6
. Marr's levelsprovide aframeworkfor understandingexplanations ofcognition. . Explanations canbe pitched atoneofthree levels:
-c omputational level -a lgorithmic level -i mplementational level.
. Cognitivepsychological explanations aretypicallyexpressed atlevels1 (functional)and2( process),b ut area ssumed to be constrained byw hatis known about level 3.
7Conclusions
Int he previous sections weh avea ttempted to outlinesomeofthe history of cognitivepsychology,its subjectmatter,andalso someofits coreassumptions. As wehaveseen,cognitivepsychologyhasarelatively longhistory,andhasmade and continuest om akemany connections withotherdisciplines. Tou nderstandthe natureofcognitivepsychology,wehavehad to considerawide range ofissues,from computation to neuroimaging, from mundaneb ut complexbehaviour such as understandinglanguage to the behaviour involved inanti-aircraftgunnery.Our surveyhast ouched on action,perception,thinking, language, problems olving, categorization,a ndc onsciousness. We havec onsidered the natureofscientific investigation,the importance ofobservation,a ndthe need for,a ndpractice of, sciencestoposittheoreticalentitiesthatcannot be observed.We havealso touched on the possibility thatcognitivepsychologym aybe aspecials cience, perhaps somewherebetweenasocialandanaturalscience.
ACTIVITY 1.4
InActivity 1.1,weasked you to writedown whatyou tookto be the characteristic featuresofascientific studyofthe mind.Take afewminutestoreviewyour listaretheresome featuresyou would want to add to the list? Andarethereany you would want to remove?
Insuch ashort chapterwehaveomitted much, andthischaptershouldberegarded as apartials urveyo fthe foundations ofc ognitivepsychology,i ntended to help you makethe most ofthe chapters thatfollow.Most notably,wehavebarely touched on the different methodsofcognitivepsychology,though the followingchapters make clearjust how centralthesemethodsareto the cognitiveapproach. We havenot intended to suggest thatcognitivepsychologyfacesn or eal challengesorproblems. Farfrom it. Most if not all ofthe topicswewill considerin thisbook arestill not fully understood-though cognitivepsychologyhasproved remarkably successful so far,itremains to be seenjust how well itwill deliversuch a full understanding.Indeed, whileintopicssuch asattention andperception cognitive psychologists havemade greatprogress,others,such asconsciousness andemotion, still present realchallenges. Thisisnot to saythatcognitivepsychologists havenot contributed greatly.Indeed, asyou will see inChapters 13,14and15amongothers, progress hasbeenmade eventhough foundationalquestions remain.
The breadthofthe many issueswehaveraised, aswell asthe results andpromise ofthe cognitiveapproach thatyou will encounterinsubsequent chapters,testifyto the importance ofdevelopingasystematic andrigorous understandingofthe mind.It also hints att he fascination ande njoyment thatcanbe gained from studying cognitivepsychology,somethingthatw eh opeyou will soon experience for yourself.
